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THE HARMS OF RACIST ONLINE HATE SPEECH
IN THE POST-COVID WORKING WORLD:
EXPANDING EMPLOYEE PROTECTIONS
Tatiana Hyman*
In one year, the COVID-19 pandemic and egregious incidents of racial
violence have created significant shifts in the United States’s workplace
culture and social climate. Many employers are transitioning employees to
long-term or permanent remote work, and conversations about racial justice
are more pervasive and divisive, especially on social media. With people
spending more time at home and on the internet, hate speech has increased
and inspired global conversations about curtailing its harmful effects.
Unlike many other countries, the United States does not penalize hate speech.
Nevertheless, its harmful effects have reached the workplace, and employers
have fired employees who posted offensive speech on their personal social
media pages. Penalizing racist or offensive social media posts is left to
employers’ discretion, resulting in inconsistent court rulings. More
specifically, some courts have found conduct outside of the workplace and
on social media to be actionable in workplace harassment claims while
others have not. This Note proposes that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission should expand its guidelines to state that courts should consider
racist hate speech on an employee’s personal social media page in the
totality of the circumstances in Title VII hostile work environment claims.
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INTRODUCTION
“If Facebook were a country, it would have the largest population on
earth.”1 The percentage of American adults using social media platforms has
risen from 5 percent to over 70 percent in fifteen years.2 As one of the most
popular online activities, social media3 has become a primary means of
networking for individuals and marketing for businesses.4 Although social
media has conferred several societal benefits, including connectivity,
education, information sharing, and community building, it has also had
significant negative effects on society, particularly through “online hate

1. Evan Osnos, Can Mark Zuckerberg Fix Facebook Before It Breaks Democracy?, NEW
YORKER (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/17/can-markzuckerberg-fix-facebook-before-it-breaks-democracy [https://perma.cc/7UEH-ZCBN].
2. See J. Clement, Percentage of U.S. Population Who Currently Use Any Social Media
from 2008 to 2019, STATISTA (May 19, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/273476/
percentage-of-us-population-with-a-social-network-profile [https://perma.cc/QYK4-R9Y4];
Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/
internet/fact-sheet/social-media [https://perma.cc/8DY6-836J].
3. See Andreas Kaplan & Michael Haenlein, Users of the World, Unite!: The Challenges
and Opportunities of Social Media, 53 BUS. HORIZONS 59, 60 (2010) (defining social media
as a general term that can be broken down into six categories: collaborative projects, blogs,
content communities, social networking sites, virtual game worlds, and virtual social worlds).
For purposes of this Note, the term “social media” will refer to interactive social networking
sites, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.
4. See Maya E. Dollarhide, Social Media Definition, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 6, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/social-media.asp
[https://perma.cc/3V6Q-6WLW]
(stating that “[s]ocial media originated as a way to interact with friends and family but was
later adopted by businesses which wanted to take advantage of a popular new communication
method to reach out to customers”).
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speech”5 and harassment.6 In a nationally representative survey conducted
in January 2020, 44 percent of respondents said that they experienced online
harassment.7 Additionally, 25 percent of respondents who reported that they
experienced online harassment said that the harassment focused on their
ethnicity or race.8 Since the survey, online hate speech has increased due to
the confluence of the COVID-19 pandemic and rising racial tensions across
the nation.9
During the COVID-19 outbreak, many employees transitioned to work
from home to “flatten the curve” and comply with lockdown orders.10 Along
with these transitions came an increase in videoconferencing on various
platforms such as Zoom, Skype, and Microsoft Teams.11 Remote work
created challenges for employees, including miscommunication, poor

5. See IGINIO GAGLIARDONE ET AL., COUNTERING ONLINE HATE SPEECH 10 (2015)
(explaining that the definition of hate speech is complex but that hate speech generally “refers
to expressions that advocate incitement to harm (particularly, discrimination, hostility or
violence) based upon the target’s being identified with a certain social or demographic
group”); see also Speech, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining hate speech as
speech “whose sole purpose is to demean people on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender,
religion, age, disability, or some other similar ground, esp. when the communication is likely
to provoke violence”). This Note uses “social media hate speech,” “online hate speech,” “hate
speech,” and “racist speech” to refer broadly to speech conveyed through text or images that
is offensive, derogatory, and fuels discrimination, hostility, or violence toward people because
of their race.
6. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, ONLINE HATE AND HARASSMENT: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE
2020,
at
17
(2020),
https://www.adl.org/media/14643/download
[https://perma.cc/S4BM-MDBQ]. See generally Waseem Akram, A Study on Positive and
Negative Effects of Social Media on Society, INT’L J. COMPUT. SCI. & ENG’G, Oct. 2017, at 347.
7. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 6, at 7.
8. Id. at 11.
9. See U.N. Secretariat, United Nations Guidance Note on Addressing and Countering
COVID-19 Related Hate Speech, at 2 (May 11, 2020), https://digitallibrary.un.org/
record/3863213?ln=en [https://perma.cc/67ZF-DYNP] (stating that the pandemic has brought
an increase in hate speech and discrimination and that “COVID-19 related hate speech” is
being spread through social media and other platforms); see also Sara Fischer, Hate Speech
Has Soared Online Since George Floyd’s Death, AXIOS (July 21, 2020),
https://www.axios.com/hate-speech-online-soars-after-george-floyds-death-463871bb-dfe44b0c-becc-e59cdcfb6336.html [https://perma.cc/AE5R-HA3X]; Craig Timberg & Allyson
Chiu, As the Coronavirus Spreads, So Does Online Racism Targeting Asians, New Research
Shows, WASH. POST (April 8, 2020, 5:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2020/04/08/coronavirus-spreads-so-does-online-racism-targeting-asians-newresearch-shows [https://perma.cc/MB92-THBE].
10. See Rita Zeidner, Coronavirus Makes Work from Home the New Normal, SHRM
(Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/all-things-work/pages/remote-workhas-become-the-new-normal.aspx [https://perma.cc/RZ3G-XHMK].
11. See Bob O’Donnell, Zoom, the Office and the Future: What Will Work Look Like
After Coronavirus?, USA TODAY (Sept. 7, 2020, 12:42 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/tech/columnist/2020/09/07/zoom-work-from-home-future-office-aftercoronavirus/5680284002 [https://perma.cc/MM4A-LSX2].
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collaboration, isolation,12 and “Zoom fatigue.”13 Despite these challenges,
several employers plan to let employees work from home permanently even
Thus, the increased usage of
after the pandemic subsides.14
telecommunication is likely to remain, forever changing the workplace from
one that employees largely experience in a brick-and-mortar building to one
that many employees will experience completely online.15
In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing transitions in the
workplace, another sickness shook the nation. On May 25, 2020, the police
killing of George Floyd brought the realities of racial tension in America to
the forefront of people’s hearts, minds, and social media timelines.16 As the
hashtag #BlackLivesMatter17 brought more visibility to support for racial
12. See Working Remotely:
Careers, Management and Strategy, GALLUP,
https://www.gallup.com/workplace/316313/understanding-and-managing-remoteworkers.aspx#ite-316508 [https://perma.cc/W3JK-AUHS] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
13. See Liz Fosslien & Mollie West Duffy, How to Combat Zoom Fatigue, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Apr. 29, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/04/how-to-combat-zoom-fatigue [https://perma.cc/
RQQ3-EZEQ].
14. See Allana Akhtar, Dropbox Will Let All Employees Work from Home Permanently
as It Turns Its Offices into WeWork-Like ‘Collaborative Spaces,’ BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 13, 2020,
4:58 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/dropbox-letting-all-employees-work-fromhome-permanently-2020-10 [https://perma.cc/HR3N-7Z4M]; Uri Berliner, Get a
Comfortable Chair: Permanent Work from Home Is Coming, NPR (June 22, 2020, 12:26 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/22/870029658/get-a-comfortable-chair-permanent-work-fromhome-is-coming [https://perma.cc/EET3-9ERU]; Shannon Bond, Facebook Expects Half Its
Employees to Work Remotely Permanently, NPR (May 21, 2020, 5:15 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/05/21/860382831/facebookexpects-half-its-employees-to-work-remotely-forever [https://perma.cc/2VKT-FKM5]; Rob
McLean, These Companies Plan to Make Working from Home the New Normal. As in
Forever, CNN (June 25, 2020, 6:57 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/22/tech/work-fromhome-companies/index.html [https://perma.cc/4WK4-XAE5]; Jennifer Surane, Synchrony to
Let All U.S. Staff Work from Home Permanently, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20, 2020, 9:06 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-20/synchrony-to-allow-u-s-employeesto-work-from-home-permanently [https://perma.cc/5RXT-NM9F].
15. See Katherine Guyot & Isabel V. Sawhill, Telecommuting Will Likely Continue Long
After the Pandemic, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2020/04/06/telecommuting-will-likely-continue-long-after-the-pandemic
[https://perma.cc/2N69-9JQ4]; Rani Molla, Office Work Will Never Be the Same, VOX (May
21, 2020, 7:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/5/21/21234242/coronavirus-COVID19-remote-work-from-home-office-reopening [https://perma.cc/RB3D-54UK] (stating that
reliance on technology and workplace software like videoconferencing and chat applications
will likely continue even after people return to the office).
16. See Monica Anderson et al., #BlackLivesMatter Surges on Twitter After George
Floyd’s Death, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 10, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2020/06/10/blacklivesmatter-surges-on-twitter-after-george-floyds-death
[https://
perma.cc/KWX2-33AQ]; Tyrone Beason, ‘Something Is Not Right.’ George Floyd Protests
Push White Americans to Think About Their Privilege, L.A. TIMES (June 28, 2020, 6:00AM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-06-28/white-voters-racism-reckoning-georgefloyd-killing [https://perma.cc/6F68-UA7W]; Evan Hill et al., How George Floyd Was Killed
in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/
us/george-floyd-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/4T9Q-WZZK].
17. #BlackLivesMatter is a movement that began in 2013 after a jury acquitted George
Zimmerman of the murder of Trayvon Martin, an unarmed Black teenager. See About, BLACK
LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about [https://perma.cc/2YVK-BGQB] (last
visited Jan. 27, 2021); Aleem Maqbool, Black Lives Matter: From Social Media Post to

2021]

THE HARMS OF RACIST ONLINE HATE SPEECH

1557

justice18 and as nationwide protests intensified,19 online hate speech
increased in response.20 The explosion of social media usage as people spent
more time indoors and on their mobile devices because of the COVID-19
lockdown21 further exacerbated the spread of hate speech.
As hate speech intensified, social media companies faced pressure from
civil rights groups and corporate advertisers to regulate hate speech on their
platforms.22 Unlike many other countries,23 the United States does not
regulate the dissemination of hate speech.24 Thus, the main restrictive
measures against online hate speech are the policies that social media
companies implement and the use of content moderation to remove posts that
violate those policies.25 While social media companies have made some
Global Movement, BBC (July 9, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada53273381 [https://perma.cc/WUQ8-RJNR].
18. See Anderson et al., supra note 16; Scottie Andrew, People Are Tweeting About Black
Lives Matter Now More than at Any Point in the Movement’s History, CNN (June 11, 2020,
3:35
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/11/us/black-lives-matter-hashtag-popularitytrnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/R3KU-W24R].
19. See Derrick Bryson Taylor, George Floyd Protests: A Timeline, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-protests-timeline.html
[https://
perma.cc/289K-SDA4].
20. See Fischer, supra note 9.
21. See Sarah Fischer, Social Media Use Spikes During Pandemic, AXIOS (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://www.axios.com/social-media-overuse-spikes-in-coronavirus-pandemic-764b384da0ee-4787-bd19-7e7297f6d6ec.html [https://perma.cc/33E4-Q5XW]; Ella Koeze &
Nathaniel Popper, The Virus Changed the Way We Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/07/technology/coronavirus-internet-use.html
[https://perma.cc/PDA5-8LFP]; Alexandra Samet, How the Coronavirus Is Changing US
Social Media Usage, EMARKETER (July 29, 2020), https://www.emarketer.com/content/howcoronavirus-changing-us-social-media-usage [https://perma.cc/VT89-9X7X] (stating that
“[t]he Harris Poll conducted between late March and early May, found that between 46% and
51% of US adults were using social media more since the outbreak began”).
22. See Claire Atkinson, Facebook Is Facing Its Biggest Backlash Yet, as Advertiser
Boycott Gains Momentum, NBC NEWS (June 24, 2020, 3:59 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/facebook-faces-growing-pressureadvertisers-do-more-counteract-hate-speech-n1231786
[https://perma.cc/
5L9J-WWPY] (describing a wave of companies that have joined together through the Stop
Hate for Profit campaign to pull advertising from Facebook and put pressure on Facebook to
improve the counteraction of hate speech); Civil Rights Groups Call for ‘Pause’ on Facebook
Ads, U.S. NEWS (June 17, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/technology/articles/2020-0617/civil-rights-groups-call-for-pause-on-facebook-ads
[https://perma.cc/K7RZ-UA3U];
George Floyd: Ben & Jerry’s Joins Facebook Ad Boycott, BBC NEWS (June 24, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53146256 [https://perma.cc/U259-CA6T]; Barbara
Ortutay & Tali Arbel, Social Media Platforms Face a Reckoning Over Hate Speech,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(June
29,
2020),
https://apnews.com/article/
6d0b3359ee5379bd5624c9f1024a0eaf [https://perma.cc/9XB4-MWWW].
23. Alexander Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech on the Internet, 38
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817, 858 (2001) (listing countries that prohibit the dissemination of hate
speech, including Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cyprus, England, France, Germany,
India, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland).
24. See Richard Stengel, Opinion, Why America Needs a Hate Speech Law, WASH. POST
(Oct. 29, 2019, 8:20 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/10/29/whyamerica-needs-hate-speech-law [https://perma.cc/KKZ7-S6VW]; infra Part I.D.
25. See Cogito Tech LLC, What Is Social Media Content Moderation and How
Moderation Companies Use Various Techniques to Moderate Contents?, MEDIUM (May 11,
2020), https://medium.com/cogitotech/what-is-social-media-content-moderation-and-how-
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efforts to curtail hate speech,26 people have criticized content moderation as
inconsistent and harmful to human moderators.27 Furthermore, Congress has
recently considered whether these existing measures are adequate to curtail
online hate speech and its dangerous effects on society.28
Only a short time after Floyd’s killing, the effects of the social unrest and
social media hate speech reached the workplace. Employers began to fire
employees who posted racist or offensive comments on their personal social
media pages.29 In the week following George Floyd’s killing, for example,
the executive producer of Law & Order fired the TV show’s spin-off writer
after he posted a picture of himself on Facebook holding a rifle and
commenting that he would “light up” looters who tried to come near his
property.30 In his remarks on Twitter, the executive producer stated, “I will
not tolerate this conduct, especially during our hour of national grief.”31 His
comments were met with both support and criticism. One Twitter user stated,
“[The spinoff writer] should not have been fired because of that statement
alone.”32 Several other private33 and public employers34 fired employees for
moderation-companies-use-various-techniques-to-a0e38bb81162
[https://perma.cc/62PHYZQJ].
26. See Karissa Bell, Twitter Will Block Links Promoting Hate Speech and Violence,
ENGADGET (July 28, 2020), https://www.engadget.com/twitter-bans-links-hateful-conductviolence-010623900.html [https://perma.cc/K2SS-WF7V]; Salvador Rodriguez, Zuckerberg:
Facebook Will Prohibit Hate Speech in Its Ads, CNBC (June 26, 2020, 5:20 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/26/zuckerberg-facebook-will-prohibit-hate-speech-in-itsads.html [https://perma.cc/MJQ2-YE9R].
27. See Andrew Arsht & Daniel Etcovitch, The Human Cost of Online Content
Moderation, JOLT DIG. (Mar. 2, 2018), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/the-human-cost-ofonline-content-moderation [https://perma.cc/N823-Y2AL]; Jillian C. York & Corynne
McSherry, Content Moderation Is Broken. Let Us Count the Ways., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.
(Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/04/content-moderation-broken-let-uscount-ways [https://perma.cc/2M7Q-56WH].
28. See infra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Andrew Dalton, People Are Getting Fired Over Racist, Violent, and
Insensitive Social Media Posts, FORTUNE (June 4, 2020, 3:30 PM), https://fortune.com/2020/
06/04/racist-violent-social-media-firings-grant-napear-craig-gore [https://perma.cc/D3FHTJ4L].
30. Sandra Gonzalez, ‘Law & Order’ Spinoff Fires Writer After He Appeared to Make
Threatening Social Media Post, CNN (June 2, 2020, 10:37 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2020/06/02/entertainment/craig-gore/index.html [https://perma.cc/NP9S-QSXG].
31. Wolf Entertainment (@WolfEnt), TWITTER (June 2, 2020, 2:31 PM),
https://twitter.com/WolfEnt/status/1267886470670323714 [https://perma.cc/7WYP-Y7RG].
32. Riley Scott (@rileypscott), TWITTER (June 2, 2020, 9:18 PM), https://twitter.com/
rileypscott/status/1267988912317882368 [https://perma.cc/WU8B-XMNJ].
33. See, e.g., Will Thorne, ‘The Flash’ Star Hartley Sawyer Fired Over Racist,
Misogynistic Tweets, VARIETY (June 8, 2020, 11:00 AM), https://variety.com/2020/tv/news/
the-flash-hartley-sawyer-fired-racist-tweets-1234627876 [https://perma.cc/WU8B-XMNJ].
34. See, e.g., Noah Goldberg, MTA Aims to Fire Worker for Racist Social Media Post
Targeting George Floyd Protesters, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 12, 2020, 12:07 PM),
https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ny-mta-fire-employee-george-floyd-protests-jasonbrown-racist-20200612-e3lao7wk4zgwppl2natqn3gzka-story.html [https://perma.cc/2TVVFDDC]; Katie Way, Cops Are Getting Fired Over Their Racist Social Media Posts, VICE (June
11, 2020, 4:04 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/dyz7yz/cops-getting-fired-for-racistsocial-media-posts [https://perma.cc/VL72-YUQB]; see also Bennett v. Metro. Gov’t, 977
F.3d 530, 538 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that a public employee’s social media posting with a
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posting racist comments. Although firings for racist speech occurred before
the COVID-19 pandemic and the killing of George Floyd,35 this new wave
of terminations garnered substantial criticism, including from former
president Donald Trump.36
The crux of the debate is this: to what extent should employers have the
right to fire employees for posts on their personal social media pages? As it
stands, restrictions on how an employer can respond to employees’ racist
social media posts depend on whether the employer is private or public. In
every state except for Montana, private employment is at will, meaning an
employee can be fired or can quit at any time and for any cause.37 Generally,
the only restrictions on a private employer’s right to fire an employee are
statutory protections under the National Labor Relations Act,38 the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,39and the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989.40
On the other hand, the First Amendment41 protects the speech of public
employees to a degree.42 When evaluating a public employee’s free speech
claim, the U.S. Supreme Court balances an employee’s right to comment on
matters of public concern with the state’s interest, as an employer, in
efficiently providing services to the public.43 Recently, the Fourth Circuit
racially charged comment on the outcome of the presidential election was not highly protected
speech).
35. See, e.g., Venable v. Metro. Gov’t, 430 F. Supp. 3d 350, 353–55 (M.D. Tenn. 2019).
36. Trump commented that cancel culture is a “political weapon[] . . . driving people from
their jobs.” Remarks at an Independence Day Celebration at the Mount Rushmore National
Memorial in Keystone, South Dakota, 2020 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (July 3, 2020),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202000494/pdf/DCPD-202000494.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6H4N-RRBP]; see also Moshe Z. Marvit & Shaun Richman, If “Cancel Culture” Is
About Getting Fired, Let’s Cancel at-Will Employment, IN THESE TIMES (July 29, 2020),
https://inthesetimes.com/article/cancel-culture-just-cause-union-labor-employment
[https://perma.cc/PC4T-N688] (arguing that an employer’s right to fire at-will should be
curbed by a just cause standard). In an open letter signed by over 150 academics, J. K.
Rowling and her fellow writers stated, “We need to preserve the possibility of good-faith
disagreement without dire professional consequences.” A Letter on Justice and Open Debate,
HARPER’S MAG. (July 7, 2020), https://harpers.org/a-letter-on-justice-and-open-debate
[https://perma.cc/6NCH-R8LL].
37. Lisa Guerin, Employment at Will:
What Does It Mean?, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/employment-at-will-definition-30022.html
[https://perma.cc/P2FN-ZJ6Q] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 151–169. The National Labor Relations Act prevents employers from
limiting speech that is related to concerted activity. Id. § 157.
39. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from discharging an
individual based on the individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1).
40. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 and
22 U.S.C.). The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 protects federal whistleblowers who
work for the government and report the possible existence of an activity constituting a
violation of law, rules, or regulations. Id.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
42. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983) (stating that “a public employee does
not relinquish First Amendment rights to comment on matters of public interest”).
43. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); see also Connick, 461 U.S.
at 150 (stating that “[t]he Pickering balance requires full consideration of the government’s
interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public”).
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arrived at divergent holdings in cases involving public employees and the
regulation of their speech on social media.44
Regardless of this divergence between the rights of private and public
employers to terminate employees for racist or offensive social media posts,
all employers with at least fifteen employees are subject to workplace
harassment claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.45 Under Title VII of
the Act, employees can sue their employers for failing to prevent or correct
harassment and, specifically, for conduct that creates a “hostile work
environment.”46 However, Title VII and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s (EEOC) guidance on harassment do not specify whether
employees may have recourse for content that coworkers post on their
personal social media pages when the content creates a hostile work
environment. Although employers are expected to prevent and correct
workplace harassment that occurs in the workplace, the extent of an
employer’s responsibility to prevent and correct harassment that occurs on
social media is less clear. In light of the changing contours of the workplace
and the growing recognition of the harms of hate speech, an evaluation of
employers’ responsibility to prevent and correct employees’ racist online
hate speech is necessary.47
This Note considers how the EEOC can update its employment
discrimination guidelines to protect employees from the effects of racist
online hate speech that creates a hostile work environment. Part I describes
the development of the hostile work environment claim, the boundaries of
employer liability, the tensions between sexual harassment and racial
harassment jurisprudence, and the protections that social media companies
have against hate speech. Part II discusses courts’ responses to and debate
regarding harassment outside of the workplace and on social media. Finally,
Part III proposes that the EEOC should expand its regulations to state that, in
hostile work environment claims, courts may consider racist hate speech on
employees’ personal social media pages in the totality of the circumstances.

44. Compare Grutzmacher v. Howard County, 851 F.3d 332, 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2017)
(holding that a county fire department did not violate an employee’s First Amendment rights
upon discharging him for liking and positively replying to a “racially charged” comment made
on a social media post because the employer’s interest in preventing workplace disruption
outweighed the employee’s free speech interest), with Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844
F.3d 400, 408 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that a police department’s social media policy
prohibiting the dissemination of any information “that would tend to discredit or reflect
unfavorably upon the [Department]” violated a police officer’s First Amendment rights
(alteration in original)).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining employer as “a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees”).
46. Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/
harassment [https://perma.cc/JFX2-9AJ6] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021); see infra Part I.A.
47. See infra Part III.
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I. THE HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL MEDIA HATE SPEECH
PROTECTIONS
Hostile work environment jurisprudence has developed, primarily,
through a series of cases involving claims of sexual harassment in the brickand-mortar workplace.48 This Note considers how the EEOC can bolster
protections in the workplace against racial harassment and hate speech
online.
Part I discusses the legal background of the hostile work environment
claim and describes how hate speech is regulated in the United States in
contrast to other countries. Part I.A describes the development of the hostile
work environment jurisprudence through case law and EEOC regulation.
Part I.B explains the different standards for employer liability in hostile work
environment claims. Part I.C highlights scholarship about racial harassment
claims and how they should be assessed in light of the overriding
jurisprudential and academic focus on sexual harassment. Finally, Part I.D
discusses the policies that social media companies have against hate speech,
which are the primary protections against online hate speech in the United
States. Part I.D also highlights Congress’s recent considerations about
expanding protections against hate speech.
A. Development of the Hostile Work Environment Claim
The hostile work environment claim is a federal discrimination claim that
the EEOC and courts developed under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.49 The
Act is a federal statute that was born out of the civil rights movement and
prohibits discrimination in a range of areas including employment.50 Title
VII of the Act prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.51 Under Title
VII, Congress also established the EEOC, a federal agency authorized to
issue, amend, and rescind regulations under the Act.52 The EEOC also has
the authority to enforce these regulations53 and investigate claims.54
48. See infra Parts I.A–B.
49. See infra notes 67–68, 79–80 and accompanying text.
50. See The Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Long Struggle for Freedom, LIBR. OF CONG.,
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/civil-rights-act/epilogue.html [https://perma.cc/VX6E-9XWT]
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
52. See id. § 2000e-12.
53. See id. § 2000e-5.
54. Anyone who believes they have faced discrimination in the workplace can file a
charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See id. § 2000e-8; Filing a Charge of Discrimination
with the EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/filingcharge-discrimination [https://perma.cc/9BZB-MAFQ] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). Once the
employee files the charge, the EEOC notifies the organization and investigates whether there
is reasonable cause to believe discrimination occurred. If the EEOC is unable to conclude that
there is reasonable cause to believe discrimination occurred, it will notify the charging party,
who then has a right to file a federal lawsuit within ninety days of the notice. If the EEOC
determines there is a reasonable chance discrimination occurred, it will invite the parties to
resolve the charge through mediation or settlement, an informal process called conciliation.
If conciliation is unsuccessful, the EEOC has the authority to enforce violations of its statutes
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Although Title VII’s text does not explicitly include the word
“harassment,” the recognition of workplace harassment claims began in
Rogers v. EEOC,55 where the Fifth Circuit interpreted § 2000e-2(a)(1) of the
Act56 to prohibit practices that create a work environment that is “heavily
charged” with discrimination.57 In Rogers, an employee filed a claim with
the EEOC against her employers, who owned an optometry business.58 She
claimed that she suffered discrimination, in part, because her employer had a
practice of segregating patients.59 The employer argued that this charge
could not relate to an unlawful employment practice because the
discrimination was aimed at patients rather than employees.60 Referring to
the text of § 2000e-2(a)(1) of Title VII,61 the court reasoned that Congress
intended to define discrimination “in the broadest possible terms.”62
Furthermore, the court reasoned that employment discrimination had more
“nuances and subtleties” that could not be “confined to bread and butter
issues.”63 Thus, the court held that the creation of a work environment
“heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination” was unlawful.64 The
court also held that statutory protection against employer abuse and
workplace discrimination extended to the protection of an employee’s
psychological as well as economic well-being.65
At the time of the Rogers decision, the EEOC’s Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex did not explicitly mention or prohibit
harassment.66 In 1980, however, the EEOC amended its guidelines to add
by filing a federal lawsuit. See What You Can Expect After a Charge Is Filed, U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/what-you-can-expect-aftercharge-filed [https://perma.cc/YLV8-RLKB] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
55. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
56. Section 2000e-2(a)(1) of the Act states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
57. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
58. See id. at 236.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 238.
61. See supra note 56.
62. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. (stating that § 2000e-2(a)(1) of the Act prohibits the creation of a work
environment that can “destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of
minority group workers”).
66. At the time of the Rogers decision, the EEOC’s Guidelines on Discrimination Because
of Sex only contained § 1604.1–1604.10, which set forth several guidelines related to sex
discrimination including situations when employers could not use sex as a bona fide
occupational qualification and prohibitions against: classifying a job as “male” or “female,”
discrimination against married women, job advertising that indicates a preference based on
sex, sex discrimination by employment agencies, preemployment inquiries that discriminate
based on sex, sex discrimination with regard to “fringe benefits,” and discrimination relating
to pregnancy and childbirth. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 37 Fed. Reg.
6835, 6836–37 (Apr. 5,1972) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604).
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29 C.F.R. § 1604.11, Sexual Harassment (“EEOC Harassment Guidelines”),
a rule specifically prohibiting sexual harassment.67 In its description of the
rule, the EEOC noted its aim to curtail the continued prevalence of sexual
harassment and stated that “under Title VII, employees should be afforded a
working environment free of discriminatory intimidation whether based on
sex, race, religion, or national origin.”68 Thus, although 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11
is titled “Sexual Harassment,” a footnote states that the principles in the
EEOC Harassment Guidelines apply to race, color, religion, and national
origin.69
The EEOC Harassment Guidelines set out two types of harassment claims.
Sections 1604.11(a)(1) and 1604.11(a)(2) are the basis for “quid pro quo”
sexual harassment claims, where unwelcome sexual conduct or favors
become a condition of employment or are the basis of negative employment
actions.70 Section 1604.11(a)(3) is the basis for hostile work environment
harassment claims, where conduct “unreasonably interfer[es] with an
individual’s work performance or creat[es] an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.”71 The EEOC Harassment Guidelines
further highlight that to determine whether conduct constitutes harassment,
the EEOC looks at the “totality of the circumstances,” including the “nature”
of the harassment and “the context in which the alleged incidents
occurred.”72 Furthermore, the EEOC Harassment Guidelines state that “the
determination of the legality of a particular action will be made from the
facts, on a case by case basis.”73
After the codification of the EEOC Harassment Guidelines, the Supreme
Court formally recognized harassment claims in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson.74 In Vinson, an employee sued her employer alleging that her
supervisor had sexually harassed her over three years of employment.75 The
employer contended that Title VII claims should apply only where the
employee has faced tangible or economic losses rather than psychological
harm.76 Rejecting the employer’s view, the Court first referenced the text of
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) and stated that the phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment” demonstrates Congress’s intent to prohibit a broad range of
discriminatory practices.77 Second, the Court highlighted the EEOC
67. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2020); Discrimination Because of Sex Under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as Amended; Adoption of Final Interpretive Guidelines, 45 Fed.
Reg. 74,676–77 (Nov. 10, 1980) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604).
68. Discrimination Because of Sex Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
Amended; Adoption of Interim Interpretive Guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg., 25,024, 25,024 (Apr.
11, 1980) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604).
69. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 n.1.
70. Id. § 1604.11(a).
71. Id.
72. Id. § 1604.11(b).
73. Id.
74. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
75. See id. at 59–60.
76. See id. at 64.
77. Id.
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Harassment Guidelines and the specific prohibition on conduct that creates a
hostile or offensive work environment.78 Thus, the Court held that hostile
work environment claims are actionable under Title VII79 as long as the
conduct is severe or pervasive enough to “alter the conditions of employment
and create an abusive working environment.”80 Furthermore, the Court
explained that not all conduct that can be classified as harassment rises to the
level of altering workplace conditions.81 The Court noted that the “mere
utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings”
is not severe enough to violate Title VII.82
After the Vinson decision, the EEOC issued a guidance document entitled,
“Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment.”83 The
document, issued on March 19, 1990, does not have the force of law but
sought to clarify several issues in light of the Vinson decision.84 With respect
to determining whether a work environment is hostile, the guidance stated
that the conduct should be evaluated based on an objective reasonable person
standard.85 Thus, a “petty slight” would not be sufficient, but a single, very
severe incident of harassment, such as unwelcome touching, might be.86 The
guidance also reiterated the preventative steps that the EEOC Harassment
Guidelines encourage employers to take, including implementing explicit
anti-harassment policies, and highlighted examples of appropriate and
inappropriate remedial actions by employers in response to harassment
complaints.87
The Court revisited and further considered the definition of a hostile work
environment in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.88 In Harris, the employee
sued her employer alleging that the company’s president created an abusive
or hostile work environment by constantly insulting her because of her
gender and targeting her with sexual innuendos.89 The Court considered
whether a workplace harassment claim has to involve conduct that seriously
affects a claimant’s psychological well-being or leads to the suffering of an
injury.90 The Court held that psychological injury is not required for conduct
to be actionable and reiterated the “severe or pervasive test” established in
78. See id. at 65. The Court acknowledges that the EEOC’s guidelines are not binding on
courts but that they do constitute a body of experience and judgment that the courts should
refer to. Id. For more on the Supreme Court’s deference to the EEOC, see Melissa Hart,
Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1937
(2006).
79. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 73.
80. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
81. See id.
82. Id. (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
83. Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, EEOC Notice No. N-915050 (Mar. 19, 1990), 1990 WL 1104701 [hereinafter Sexual Harassment Policy Guidance].
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Id. (quoting Zabkowicz v. W. Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984)).
87. See id.
88. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
89. See id. at 19.
90. See id. at 20.
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Vinson.91 To clarify the standard, the Court explained that conduct must be
both objectively and subjectively hostile.92 To meet the objective prong, the
conduct has to create a work environment “that a reasonable person would
find abusive or hostile.”93 To meet the subjective prong, the victim has to
perceive the environment as abusive.94 Additionally, the Court found that in
assessing whether an environment is hostile or abusive, a court must consider
the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency and severity of the
conduct, whether it was physically threatening and humiliating or a mere
utterance, whether it unreasonably interfered with the employee’s work
performance, and whether it affected the employee’s psychological wellbeing.95 The Court explained that while each of these factors is relevant,
none is required.96
Thus, the hostile work environment doctrine is informed by the EEOC
Harassment Guidelines, which favor a broad, factual, and contextual analysis
of harassment claims.97 Additionally, the Supreme Court’s holdings in
Vinson and Harris favor the prohibition of a broad range of discrimination98
and the consideration of both objective and subjective factors to determine
when harassment is severe or pervasive enough to be actionable.99
B. Employer Liability for Harassment Claims
The EEOC Harassment Guidelines also set differing standards for
employer liability depending on whether or not the harasser is a supervisor.
Previously, § 1604.11(c) set forth a vicarious liability standard under which
employers were responsible for the acts of supervisors regardless of whether
the acts were authorized by or known to the employer.100 Section 1604.11(d)
sets forth a negligence standard under which employers are responsible for
the acts of nonsupervisory employees where the employer knew or should
have known of the conduct and failed to take immediate and appropriate
corrective action.101
Section 1604.11(d) is still the operable standard for employee liability for
the acts of nonsupervisory employees.102 The EEOC, however, rescinded
§ 1604.11(c) after the Supreme Court decided the 1988 companion cases,
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth103 and Faragher v. City of Boca
91. See id. at 21–22.
92. See id. at 21.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 21–22.
95. See id. at 22.
96. See id. at 23.
97. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 77, 95–96 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
100. See Discrimination Because of Sex Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as Amended; Adoption of Final Interpretive Guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676, 74,677 (Nov.
10, 1980) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604).
101. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (2020).
102. Id.; see also Harassment, supra note 46.
103. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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Raton.104 In both cases, the employees claimed their supervisors sexually
harassed them.105 The Court decided that the EEOC’s vicarious liability
standard should only apply in instances where a supervisor106 creates a
hostile work environment that results in a “tangible employment action.”107
Where the supervisor’s harassment does not result in a tangible employment
action, the Court established that the employer can raise an affirmative
defense comprised of two elements: (1) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to promptly prevent and correct harassment and (2) that the
plaintiff-employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive or
corrective measures offered by the employer.108 The Court reasoned that this
negligence standard would not only accommodate the agency principles of
vicarious liability but also encourage employers to establish preventative
measures and encourage employees to report harassment.109
Thus, the EEOC and the Supreme Court have framed a liability standard
under which employers are penalized when they fail to acknowledge
harassment in the workplace or take steps to prevent or correct it.110 Under
this standard, employees are also required to utilize the preventative and
corrective measures established by their employers before their employers
will be liable for creating a hostile work environment.111
C. Tension Between Racial Harassment Claims and Sexual Harassment
Jurisprudence
Although the workplace harassment claim originated in Rogers, a case
involving a racially hostile work environment, harassment jurisprudence and
legal scholarship have mainly focused on sexual harassment.112 Since its
codification in the EEOC Harassment Guidelines, racial harassment has been
under the regulatory cover of sexual harassment.113 Furthermore, the five
Supreme Court cases through which the hostile work environment
104. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
105. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747–48; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
106. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (2013). In Vance, the Supreme Court
“reject[ed] the nebulous definition of a ‘supervisor’ advocated in the EEOC Guidance” and
defined “supervisor” as an employee who is “empowered by the employer to take tangible
employment actions against the victim.” Id. at 424, 431.
107. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (highlighting examples of a tangible employment action
including discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808
(same); see Harassment, supra note 46 (explaining that an employer is automatically liable
for harassment by a supervisor that causes an employee to be terminated, not promoted, or to
lose wages).
108. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
109. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
110. See supra notes 101–02, 108 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
112. See Robert T. Carter & Thomas D. Scheuermann, Legal and Policy Standards for
Addressing Workplace Racism: Employer Liability and Shared Responsibility for Race-Based
Traumatic Stress, 12 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1, 23 (2012); Pat K. Chew
& Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
49, 56–57 (2006).
113. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also Carter & Scheuermann, supra note
112, at 29.
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jurisprudence developed involved sexual harassment claims.114 Though the
principles established in each of these cases apply to racial harassment,
conceptualizing different forms of racial harassment is difficult because there
is a lack of scholarship discussing racial harassment exclusively.115
However, on its website, the EEOC broadly defines racial harassment as
including “racial slurs, offensive or derogatory remarks about a person’s race
or color, or the display of racially-offensive symbols” and states that “the law
doesn’t prohibit simple teasing, offhand comments, or isolated incidents that
are not very serious.”116 Thus, racial harassment claims usually only succeed
when they involve “overt, repeated and egregious racist/hostile acts.”117
Professor L. Camille Hébert contextualizes this by arguing that imposing
strict sexual harassment standards, such as the severe or pervasive standard,
to racial harassment claims may lead courts to find that serious racially
discriminatory acts are not actionable.118 She explains that analogizing racial
harassment and sexual harassment claims may not properly acknowledge the
differences between them, including differences in historical context and
how individuals experience each form of harassment.119 Professor Hébert
posits that analogizing racial and sexual harassment claims is a “two-edged
sword” because, while it may legitimize sexual harassment claims, it might
also subvert legitimate racial harassment claims.120
The harms of hate speech are likely exacerbated by the limited academic
focus on the effectiveness, or the lack thereof, of racial harassment laws in
preventing a racially hostile work environment. If racial harassment claims
are only successful when offenses are extremely overt, but not when they are
subtle yet harmful, then the racial harassment jurisprudence fails to achieve
its purpose of preventing a workplace environment where the conditions of

114. See Melissa K. Hughes, Note, Through the Looking Glass: Racial Jokes, Social
Context, and the Reasonable Person in Hostile Work Environment Analysis, 76 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1437, 1439 (2003); see also, e.g., Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742; Faragher, 524 U.S. 775; Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.
17 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
115. See Carter & Scheuermann, supra note 112, at 24; Chew & Kelley, supra note 112, at
62 (stating that although there is considerable academic discourse about conceptualizing
sexual harassment, “not one major legal article exists to conceptualize racial harassment as a
unique social phenomenon and harm deserving its own jurisprudential framework”).
116. Race/Color Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/racecolor-discrimination [https://perma.cc/B9BQ-LVAG] (last visited
Jan. 27, 2021).
117. Carter & Scheuermann, supra note 112, at 31.
118. See L. Camille Hébert, Analogizing Race and Sex in Workplace Harassment Claims,
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 819, 878 (1997).
119. See id. at 837, 839. Professor Hébert states that the historical denial of equal rights to
women has not left the same legacy as “slavery, segregation, and centuries of racial hatred.”
Id. at 837. Professor Hébert also notes that, while women have been conditioned to receive
harassment as “ambiguously motivated,” individuals experience racial harassment as
“unambiguously hostile.” Id. at 839.
120. See id. at 820; see also Pat K. Chew, Freeing Racial Harassment from the Sexual
Harassment Model, 85 OR. L. REV. 615, 641 (2006) (arguing that “analogizing racial
harassment to sexual harassment in the absence of further study . . . is problematic”).
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employment are altered.121 As the next section will demonstrate, the lack of
federal protections against online hate speech in the United States possibly
adds to the harms of hate speech as well.
D. Efforts to Curtail Online Hate Speech in the United States and Abroad
In the United States, unlike many other countries, hate speech is
unregulated.122 The First Amendment generally does not protect speech in
certain categories, such as incitement to imminent lawless action, fighting
words, and true threats.123 The Supreme Court has declined the opportunity
to recognize hate speech as belonging to these categories. Specifically, the
Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari in Collin v. Smith,124 where the
Seventh Circuit held that a local ordinance prohibiting the dissemination of
materials with hateful content was unconstitutional.125 There, the Village of
Skokie sought to prevent the Socialist Party of America from having a Nazi
protest displaying swastikas and disseminating placards with statements such
as “White Free Speech.”126 The Seventh Circuit held that the village’s local
ordinance was unconstitutional because it prohibited speech that was not
lewd and obscene, profane, libelous, or fighting words that would cause
violence or disorder.127 In other words, the court found that the hateful
speech did not fall into a class of speech that can be constitutionally
prevented or punished.128
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that hate speech,
although it offends, is protected by the First Amendment.129 Commentators
have posited that the United States’s protection of hate speech coupled with
121. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
122. See Kevin Boyle, Hate Speech—the United States Versus the Rest of the World?, 53
ME. L. REV. 487, 499 (2001) (explaining that the United States attached a reservation to Article
20 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which prohibits
national, religious, or religious speech that incites discrimination, stating that it would restrict
free speech protected by the Constitution).
123. See Lauren E. Beausoleil, Note, Free, Hateful, and Posted: Rethinking First
Amendment Protection of Hate Speech in a Social Media World, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2101, 2104
(2019); see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (stating that the First Amendment
does not protect “true threats”—that is, statements that communicate a serious intent to
unlawfully commit violence against a particular individual or group of individuals);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (holding that advocacy that incites
imminent lawless action can be proscribed); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect “fighting words” that by
utterance inflict injury or incite a breach of the peace).
124. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (mem.).
125. See id. at 1207.
126. Id. at 1200.
127. See id. at 1204.
128. See id.
129. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding that a Minnesota
ordinance violated the First Amendment where the ordinance prohibited conduct known to
cause anger or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender); see
also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2018) (stating that free speech jurisprudence
protects the expression of speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion,
age, disability, or any other similar ground).
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the discretion it grants to social media companies has created a safe haven
for those who share hate speech online.130
Social media companies have broad discretion in regulating the conduct
on their websites due to the Communications Decency Act of 1996.131 The
Communications Decency Act protects social media companies from
liability for content that its users share.132 Despite this latitude, however,
social media companies have established policies around hate speech, in part
because of the pressure they face from civil rights groups and activists.133
Facebook’s hate speech policy states that Facebook does not allow hate
speech because “it creates an environment of intimidation and exclusion,”134
and its policy continues to expand to include more forms of hate speech.135
This prohibition also applies to content on Instagram, which Facebook
owns.136 Twitter prohibits hateful conduct, including the posting of “content
that intends to dehumanize, degrade, or reinforce negative or harmful
stereotypes about a protected category.”137 Despite these policies, however,
hate speech persists. In the second quarter of 2020, Facebook removed 22.5
million posts that violated the hate speech policy.138 The number of hateful
posts on Instagram also quadrupled to 3.3 million in the second quarter of
2020, from 800,000 in the first quarter.139
Social media policies and content moderation efforts have garnered much
backlash, and the regulation of the internet has become a hotly contested
political debate. On May 28, 2020, then president Trump signed an executive
order condemning social media companies for “engaging in selective
censorship” and “stifl[ing] viewpoints with which they disagree.”140 Since
then, the CEOs of Facebook, Twitter, and Google have testified before

130. See Boyle, supra note 122, at 499–500; see also Tsesis, supra note 23, at 859
(explaining that the United States’s laws make it difficult for other countries to regulate hate
speech).
131. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15,
18, and 47 U.S.C.).
132. See id.
133. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
134. Hate Speech, FACEBOOK CMTY. STANDARDS, https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards/hate_speech [https://perma.cc/UKB3-R3LM] (last visited Jan. 27,
2021).
135. See Oliver Effron, Facebook Will Ban Holocaust Denial Posts Under Hate Speech
Policy, CNN (Oct. 12, 2020, 2:11 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/12/tech/
facebook-holocaust-denial-hate-speech/index.html [https://perma.cc/24EG-4SQU].
136. Community
Guidelines,
INSTAGRAM,
https://www.facebook.com/help/
instagram/477434105621119 [https://perma.cc/P8H8-58YR] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
137. Hateful Conduct Policy, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-andpolicies/hateful-conduct-policy [https://perma.cc/E8TK-SXN3] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
138. Danielle Abril, Hateful Posts on Facebook and Instagram Soar, FORTUNE (Aug. 11,
2020, 2:11 PM), https://fortune.com/2020/08/11/facebook-instagram-hate-speech-violationsq2 [https://perma.cc/Q6DJ-5S43].
139. See id.
140. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020); see Brian Fung et al.,
Trump Signs Executive Order Targeting Social Media Companies, CNN (May 28, 2020, 9:22
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/28/politics/trump-twitter-social-media-executiveorder/index.html [https://perma.cc/5HFX-VNPG].
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Congress multiple times to address issues, including antitrust,141 censorship,
misinformation, and hate speech.142 Generally, both Republicans and
Democrats agree that technology companies should be subject to more
regulation,143 but they disagree about social media companies’ roles in
regulating hate speech. Republicans argue that content moderation is a form
of selective censorship that has been used disproportionately against
conservative views.144 Democrats, on the other hand, are concerned about
whether content moderation efforts can be increased to prevent the spread of
hate speech and violence.145
Although the Supreme Court has deemed the regulation of hate speech
violative of free speech,146 other countries have taken an aggressive approach
toward hate speech regulation on social media. On January 1, 2018,
Germany began enforcing the Network Enforcement Act,147 or NetzDG, a
hate speech law that penalizes companies such as Facebook, Twitter, and
YouTube with fines of up to sixty million dollars if they fail to remove
offensive speech within twenty-four hours of receiving a complaint.148

141. In addition to these congressional hearings, the government has been taking other
actions suggesting a more hands-on approach to regulating the technology industry. In
December 2020, the FTC and forty states sued Facebook alleging that it engaged in
anticompetitive practices. See Cecilia Kang & Mike Isaac, U.S. and States Say Facebook
Illegally Crushed Competition, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/12/09/technology/facebook-antitrust-monopoly.html [https:// perma.cc/9JEF-VAEN];
see also Rishi Iyengar, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook: Here’s What You Need to
Know, CNN (Dec. 11, 2020, 6:27 AM), https:// www.cnn.com/2020/12/11/tech/facebookantitrust-lawsuit-what-to-know/index.html [https:// perma.cc/3UCN-PYZ5]. In October
2020, the U.S. Department of Justice also sued Google for alleged antitrust violations. See
Cecilia Kang et al., U.S. Accuses Google of Illegally Protecting Monopoly, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/20/technology/google-antitrust.html [https://
perma.cc/SVJ6-UKF9].
142. See David Ingram & Ezra Kaplan, Congress Prepares to Grill CEOs of Amazon,
Apple, Facebook and Google, NBC NEWS (July 28, 2020, 10:15 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/congress-prepares-grill-ceos-amazon-applefacebook-google-n1234764 [https://perma.cc/EG4P-897Q]; David McCabe & Cecilia Kang,
Republicans Blast Social Media C.E.O.s While Democrats Deride Hearing, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/28/technology/senate-tech-hearing-section230.html [https://perma.cc/EGV6-LBKM]; Zuckerberg and Dorsey Face Harsh Questioning
from Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021, 7:11 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/
live/2020/11/17/technology/twitter-facebook-hearings [https://perma.cc/5EQT-KZ4J].
143. See McCabe & Kang, supra note 142 (stating that “lawmakers from both parties have
pushed for new regulations to be applied to the tech companies”).
144. At Hearing, Republicans Accuse Zuckerberg and Dorsey of Censorship, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 28, 2020, 6:28 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/10/28/technology/tech-hearing
[https://perma.cc/BNY9-J87Z].
145. See Zuckerberg and Dorsey Face Harsh Questioning from Lawmakers, supra note
142.
146. See supra note 129.
147. Netzdurchsetzunggesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], Sept. 1, 2017,
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBL] at 3352 (Ger.).
148. See Zoey Chong, Germany Kicks Year off with Strict Online Hate Speech Law, CNET
(Jan. 1, 2018, 10:15 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/german-hate-speech-law-goes-intoeffect-on-1-jan [https://perma.cc/Z529-53BY]; Marrian Zhou, Facebook: We’ve Removed
Hundreds of Posts Under German Hate Speech Law, CNET (July 27, 2018, 1:19 PM),
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Following the murder of a pro-refugee politician in 2019, which the German
government said was preceded by threats and hate speech online, the German
government increased regulation by requiring technology platforms to send
reported content directly to the federal police.149
India also penalizes online hate speech. Although the constitution of India
upholds free speech and expression, the Indian Penal Code punishes any act
that “incites or promotes disharmony or feeling of enmity or hatred between
different religious or racial or linguistic or regional groups or castes or
communities.”150 Recently, Facebook executives in India answered
questions at a hearing before an Indian parliamentary committee on
information technology over allegations that they allowed anti-Muslim hate
speech on the platform and failed to ban anti-Muslim content shared by
politicians.151
These laws have sparked an international movement toward more
regulation of hate speech on social media.152 In September 2020, the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights announced that
regional forums would take place in Europe and the Asia-Pacific focused on
combatting the “rising scapegoating and targeting of minorities on social
media platforms” and “the growth of hate speech and incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence aimed mainly at minorities.”153
As concerns about the harms of hate speech spread internationally,
considerations about employers’ responsibilities to protect against these
harms may also arise. Part II considers the differing judicial views and
scholarly debates regarding employers’ reach to regulate conduct beyond the
brick-and-mortar workplace.
https://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-weve-removed-hundreds-of-posts-under-german-hatespeech-law [https://perma.cc/VT43-6T8E].
149. See Natasha Lomas, Germany Tightens Online Hate Speech Rules to Make Platforms
Send Reports Straight to the Feds, TECHCRUNCH (June 19, 2020, 10:02 AM),
https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/19/germany-tightens-online-hate-speech-rules-to-makeplatforms-send-reports-straight-to-the-feds [https://perma.cc/D2HG-2RMK].
150. Diya Vaishnav & Nihal Deo, The Peril of Hate Speech in India, THE CRIM. L. BLOG
(Feb. 3, 2020), https://criminallawstudiesnluj.wordpress.com/2020/02/03/the-peril-of-hatespeech-in-india [https://perma.cc/SDC2-ZE7A].
151. See Rishi Iyengar, Facebook Has More Users in India than Anywhere Else. It’s Now
Dealing with a Hate Speech Crisis, CNN (Sept. 23, 2020, 8:10 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/22/tech/facebook-india-hate-speech/index.html
[https://perma.cc/U2PB-UM6B]; Sheikh Saaliq, Facebook India Grilled Over Hate Speech,
Allegations
of
Bias,
ABC
NEWS
(Sept.
2,
2020,
10:30
PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/facebook-india-grilled-hate-speech-allegedbias-72769758 [https://perma.cc/B6AF-9UD3].
152. See J. D. Tuccille, German-Style Internet Censorship Catches on Around the World,
REASON (Oct. 12, 2020, 10:38 AM), https://reason.com/2020/10/12/german-style-internetcensorship-catches-on-around-the-world [https://perma.cc/N6AH-CNGK].
153. Forums to Tackle Hate Speech, Social Media and Minorities, UNITED NATIONS OFF.
OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26256 [https://perma.cc/2FDZ-46YU]; see
also Intersectional Approach to Hate Speech Against Minorities in Social Media, THE INT’L
MOVEMENT AGAINST ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION & RACISM (Nov. 20, 2020),
https://imadr.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/IMADR_Oral-Statement_13thForum-on-Minority-Issues.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK9U-WHKH ].
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II. CONSIDERING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE WORKPLACE
The hostile work environment claim developed through cases involving
harassment that occurred in the brick-and-mortar workplace.154 Courts have
also considered cases where the incidents of harassment happened outside of
the work building. This part presents how courts and scholars have
responded to cases involving harassment outside of the workplace and on
social media.
Part II.A discusses the scholarly debates and differing judicial responses
to hostile work environment claims involving harassment outside of the
workplace. Part II.B describes how courts have responded to claims
involving social media posts on personal pages that violate employers’ social
media policies and presents existing opinions about how courts should
evaluate employer liability for employee misconduct on social media.
A. Harassment Outside of the Workplace
The text and legislative history of Title VII provide little guidance for
determining the parameters of the workplace.155 Although the bill that would
become Title VII produced the “longest continuous debate in Senate
history,”156 the legislative focus was on expanding protections for Black
Americans and the addition of sex as a protected category.157 Therefore,
there was no discussion regarding the boundaries of the workplace.158
The EEOC Harassment Guidelines159 and Policy Guidance on Current
Issues of Sexual Harassment, last updated in June 1999,160 also do not
delineate workplace boundaries. In § 1604.11(d) and (e), the EEOC
Harassment Guidelines refer to employer liability for acts of sexual
harassment “in the workplace” but do not define the workplace or its
parameters.161 The EEOC’s only mention of harassment outside of the
workplace appears on a FAQ page for the Youth@Work program.162 There,
the EEOC states that federal law protects people from harassment whether
the harassment occurs on or off the worksite.163 Despite the EEOC’s
seeming support for penalizing harassment outside of the workplace, federal
appellate courts have exhibited differing perspectives on whether conduct
outside of the workplace is relevant to harassment claims.
154. See supra Part I.A.
155. See Douglas R. Garmager, Note, Discrimination Outside of the Office: Where to
Draw the Walls of the Workplace for a “Hostile Work Environment” Claim Under Title VII,
85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2010).
156. Landmark Legislation:
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/CivilRightsAct1964.htm
[https://perma.cc/LT4C-JSKF] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
157. See Garmager, supra note 155, at 1077.
158. See id. at 1077–80.
159. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2020).
160. See Sexual Harassment Policy Guidance, supra note 83.
161. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d)–(e).
162. See Harassment—FAQs, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.
gov/youth/harassment-faqs#Q8 [https://perma.cc/3PRT-AJNP] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
163. See id.
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The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have refused to consider conduct outside of
the workplace as relevant to workplace harassment claims. In Sprague v.
Thorn Americas, Inc.,164 an employee filed a sexual harassment claim against
her employer alleging that, on five occasions across a sixteen-month period,
a male coworker made inappropriate comments to her that created a hostile
work environment.165 Four of the incidents involved verbal statements that
the male coworker made in the office, but one incident occurred at the
plaintiff’s wedding reception, where the coworker put his arm around the
plaintiff and looked down her dress.166 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the
incident at the plaintiff’s wedding was the most serious but did not consider
it as a part of the claim because it occurred “at a private club, not in the
workplace.”167 Thus, the court held that the incidents did not rise to the level
of creating a hostile work environment.168 In Gowesky v. Singing River
Hospital Systems,169 the Fifth Circuit considered a disability harassment
claim in which the employee, a physician, contracted Hepatitis C while
treating a patient.170 The employee claimed that when she was slated to
return to work, her employer instituted unreasonable conditions on her return,
which in part required her to complete refresher courses and submit weekly
blood samples.171 The employee challenged certain offensive comments that
her supervisors made to her via telephone and in writing.172 The court held
that these incidents did not rise to the level of creating a hostile work
environment and refused to extend the claim “to behavior that occurred when
[the employee] was not actually working.”173 The court asserted that
harassment “must affect a person’s working environment.”174
On the other hand, the First, Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have
considered conduct outside of the physical workplace as part of hostile work
environment claims. In Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc.,175 the employee brought
a hostile work environment claim against her employer, asserting that she
was stalked by another employee both inside and outside of the workplace.176
The employer argued that the district court abused its discretion by
considering the nonworkplace conduct.177 The First Circuit, however,
upheld the consideration of the nonworkplace conduct, reasoning that it
helped to explain why the coworker’s presence in the workplace created a

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

129 F.3d 1355 (10th Cir. 1997).
See id. at 1365.
See id. at 1366.
Id.
See id.
321 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2003).
See id. at 506.
See id. at 510.
See id. at 511.
Id. at 510.
Id.
303 F.3d 387 (1st Cir. 2002).
See id. at 392.
See id. at 409.
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hostile environment.178 In Lapka v. Chertoff,179 the plaintiff’s hostile work
environment claim stemmed from an alleged rape by a coworker that
occurred in a private hotel room while she was attending a mandatory
professional training.180 Although the conduct occurred outside of the
workplace, the court reasoned that it was relevant to the claim because the
event grew “out of the workplace environment.”181 Additionally, the court
held that harassment does not have to occur in the physical workplace to be
actionable; “it need only have consequences in the workplace.”182 In Ferris
v. Delta Airlines, Inc,183 the plaintiff, a female flight attendant, was sexually
harassed by a coworker in a hotel room during a layover.184 The Second
Circuit held that the hotel room was sufficiently connected to the work
environment to be considered a part of the claim.185
Similarly, in Moring v. Arkansas Department of Correction,186 the
plaintiff was sexually harassed by a supervisor in a private hotel room.187
The Eighth Circuit did not highlight that the incident took place outside of
the workplace but held that the incident was severe enough to affect the terms
and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment.188 In Dowd v. United
Steelworkers, Local No. 286,189 a case involving a racial harassment claim,
the court cited Moring and found that “offensive conduct does not necessarily
have to transpire at the workplace in order for a juror reasonably to conclude
that it created a hostile working environment.”190
This circuit split highlights divergent interpretations of Title VII’s reach.
While the Fifth and Tenth Circuits maintained narrow views of the
workplace,191 the Seventh Circuit considered events growing out of or having
consequences in the workplace.192 Additionally, the Second Circuit
considered events occurring in locations connected to the workplace,193 and
the Eighth Circuit considered events severe enough to affect the workplace,
even when they occurred outside of the workplace.194 This circuit split has
also produced scholarly debate about whether courts should consider conduct
outside of the workplace in harassment claims.195
178. See id. at 409–10.
179. 517 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2008).
180. See id. at 978.
181. Id. at 983.
182. Id. (citing Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 715–16 (7th Cir. 2006)).
183. 277 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2001).
184. See id. at 132.
185. See id. at 135.
186. 243 F.3d 452 (8th Cir. 2001).
187. See id. at 456–57.
188. See id. at 457.
189. 253 F.3d 1093 (8th Cir. 2001).
190. Id. at 1102.
191. See supra notes 164–73 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 181–81 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 183–84 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text.
195. See Garmager, supra note 155. But see generally Alisha A. Patterson, None of Your
Business: Barring Evidence of Non-workplace Harassment for Title VII Hostile Environment
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Douglas Garmager argues that courts should consider conduct outside of
the workplace in hostile work environment claims.196 First, Garmager
acknowledges that under the “modern notions of the workplace,” many
workplace-related events occur outside of the office.197 He posits that if
courts adopted a more progressive view, Title VII would provide the
necessary protections as the concept of the workplace expands.198 Garmager
then presents the concept of “economic waste”199 and highlights that the
collateral effects of harassment could negatively affect productivity.200
Garmager also notes that both Title VII’s text and the EEOC Harassment
Guidelines are silent regarding harassment and asserts that this silence
corresponds with the Supreme Court’s expansive view of protections against
workplace discrimination.201
Garmager takes his position a step further and argues that employer
liability should extend to all interactions between employees.202 Parrish v.
Sollecito203 is central to Garmager’s reasoning. There, a supervisor sexually
harassed an employee at an event outside of the workplace.204 In considering
whether the incident was relevant to the claim, the Southern District of New
York reasoned that there is no law that “allow[s] a harasser to pick and
choose the venue for his assaults.”205 The court concluded that sexual
harassment jurisprudence should not focus on any point in time or
location.206 Rather, it should focus on the conduct and whether the employer
has created a “workplace” where offenses occur and “alter the victim’s terms
and conditions of employment wherever the employment relationship
reasonably carries.”207 As Garmager highlights, the court also considers that
when harassment occurs outside of the workplace, the perpetrator can
“minimize or dismiss” the conduct, while the victim has to deal with its
consequences.208
Regarding the practicality of expanding workplace protections, Garmager
argues that any increased costs to employers would be negligible because
Claims, 10 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 237 (2010) (arguing that courts should not consider conduct
outside of the workplace in hostile work environment claims based on Title VII’s plain
language and agency-based employer liability standards and in the interest of preventing
employers from implementing overreaching harassment policies).
196. See Garmager, supra note 155, at 1092–102. While Garmager argues that courts
should consider all interactions between employees outside of the workplace in hostile work
environment claims, this Note specifically argues that courts should consider racist hate
speech on an employee’s personal social media page, even when the hate speech is not directly
addressed to a coworker or employee.
197. Id. at 1092–93.
198. See id. at 1093.
199. Id.
200. See id..
201. See id. at 1094–95.
202. See id. at 1095–101.
203. 249 F. Supp. 2d 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
204. See id. at 346.
205. Id. at 350–51.
206. See id. at 351.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 352; Garmager, supra note 155, at 1091.
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employers would just need to update their policies and train and inform their
employees.209 Garmager also addresses the concern that expansion of the
workplace harassment claim would cause increased litigation by asserting
that the Ellerth and Faragher negligence standards would still apply to limit
employer liability to conduct within an employer’s control.210
On the other hand, Alisha Patterson argues that the Supreme Court should
not consider conduct outside of the workplace when evaluating workplace
harassment claims.211 First, Patterson argues that Title VII’s plain text
protects an individual’s “privileges of employment” and does not mention
nonworkplace harassment alongside its use of workplace-related words, like
“hire” and “employment opportunities.”212 Thus, Patterson argues that the
plain meaning of Title VII limits protections to conduct in the workplace.213
Additionally, Patterson argues that the extension of Title VII to
nonworkplace harassment would be inconsistent with agency principles,
which “limit[] [the] scope of employment to work period, workplace, and
work services.”214 Finally, Patterson cautions that “imposing liability for
non-workplace conduct encourages employers to implement aggressive
harassment policies that insulate themselves from litigation.”215
Professor Eugene Volokh has also highlighted concerns regarding free
speech rights and hostile work environment claims. Analyzing the balance
between the government’s interest in curtailing harassment and the
preservation of free speech rights, Professor Volokh advocates for a directed
and undirected speech doctrine.216 Professor Volokh defines directed speech
as speech that is aimed at a particular employee because of the employee’s
race, sex, religion, or national origin and undirected speech as offensive
words or conversations that are not directed at an employee but are overheard
or seen by an employee.217
Professor Volokh argues that the First Amendment should protect
undirected harassing speech both inside and outside of the workplace.218
Regarding undirected harassing speech outside of the workplace, Professor
Volokh acknowledges that speech outside of the workplace can create a
hostile work environment claim but asserts that the First Amendment does
not allow the imposition of liability for speech that is public and political,
even if it creates a hostile work environment.219 As for harassing speech in
the workplace, Professor Volokh acknowledges that employers may prohibit
offensive speech for any reason, including to minimize tension in the
209. See Garmager, supra note 155, at 1101–02.
210. See id. at 1102–03.
211. See generally Patterson, supra note 195.
212. Id. at 257–58.
213. See id. at 258.
214. Id. at 262 n. 159.
215. Id. at 265.
216. See Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1846 (1992).
217. See id.
218. See id. at 1848–58.
219. See id. at 1848.
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workplace.220 He argues, however, that there is a difference between
employers restricting workplace speech and the government restricting
workplace speech221 and states that when the government is regulating
speech, it should err on the side of underregulating to avoid viewpoint
discrimination.222 Professor Volokh also discusses undirected epithets in the
workplace and suggests that it is easier to make the case for suppressing
epithets, which are “more offensive and less valuable.”223 Nevertheless, he
claims that this line is difficult to draw and that penalizing such speech could
lead to suppression of political speech, “simply because the majority or the
elite find it to be offensive.”224 On the other hand, Professor Volokh argues
that directed harassing speech should not be protected because directed
insults have little value and an employee should be free from insult.225
Considering the impact on employment policies, Professor Volokh posits
that hostile work environment regulation chills individual free speech
because the employer’s only protection against liability is the creation of zero
tolerance policies.226 Thus, he suggests, even though one individual’s
statement might not be severe or pervasive enough, it may be actionable
when aggregated with other statements, pushing employers to prohibit any
and all statements that may lead to a hostile work environment.227
B. Harassment on the Web and Social Media
As internet and social media use continue to expand, courts have also
considered claims of harassment occurring on the web. One of the first cases
to consider an employer’s responsibility to prevent workplace harassment on
the internet was Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc.228 Tammy Blakey, a
pilot for Continental Airlines, complained of sexual harassment and a hostile
work environment based on comments directed to her by several male
employees.229 Between February and July 1995, a number of male pilots
posted derogatory and insulting comments about Blakey on an online
computer bulletin board called the Crew Members Forum.230 The question
before the Supreme Court of New Jersey was whether the employer should
have a duty to prevent continuing harassment on a bulletin board given that

220. See id. at 1853.
221. Id. at 1853–54.
222. Id. at 1850–56; see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 828–29 (1995) (defining viewpoint discrimination as “an egregious form of content
discrimination” in which the government favors one speaker over another or targets particular
views).
223. Volokh, supra note 216, at 1855.
224. Id. at 1857.
225. See id. at 1863.
226. Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does “Hostile Work Environment” Harassment Law
Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627, 638–39 (1997).
227. See id.
228. 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000).
229. See id. at 543.
230. See id. at 544.
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it was not a physical location under the employer’s control.231 The court
reasoned that, although the electronic bulletin board was located outside of
the workplace, the employer still had a duty to correct the behavior.232
Furthermore, the court highlighted that conduct outside of the workplace can
still permeate the workplace.233 Thus, the court explained that, although
employers are not required to monitor an employee’s private
communications, they do have a duty to stop harassment when it occurs in
settings that are “closely related to . . . and beneficial to [the workplace].”234
The court advised that, on remand, the trial court should first consider
whether the employer derived a substantial benefit from the forum.235 The
court did not specifically define what constitutes a “substantial workplace
benefit” but indicated relevant factors to consider in determining whether an
internet platform benefits an employer.236 First, the court mentioned that the
number of people using the platform was relevant in determining the benefit
that the employer derives.237 Second, the court noted that the employer might
have benefited from the employees’ access to the information on the platform
because it may have improved efficiency and operations.238 The court also
highlighted that the ability of the employees to communicate with one
another appeared to be a benefit and stated that, here, the company bulletin
board was an extension of the workplace.239 The court emphasized,
however, that employers do not have a duty to monitor the private
communications of employees.240 Rather, the court stated, employers have
a duty to stop harassment taking place in settings related to the workplace.241
Another case involving workplace harassment on social media was AmiraJabbar v. Travel Services, Inc.242 Kareemah Amira-Jabbar, a Black female
employee, brought a workplace harassment claim against her employer.243
One of the relevant incidents involved a comment that a coworker posted on
a Facebook photo of Amira-Jabbar at a work-related event.244 Amira-Jabbar
claimed the comment was racially motivated.245 The employer argued that
it could not be held responsible for the comment because the account did not
231. See id. at 542–43.
232. See id. at 549.
233. See id.; see also Schwapp v. Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that
“[t]he mere fact that [the plaintiff] was not present when a racially derogatory comment was
made will not render that comment irrelevant to his hostile work environment claim”).
234. Blakey, 751 A.2d at 543.
235. See id. at 551.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 551–52.
238. See id. at 552.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. 726 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.P.R. 2010).
243. Id. at 81.
244. See id. In the comments section of the picture, Amira-Jabbar wrote “remind me that
taking pictures in the shade is really a dis-service to my wonderful chocolate skin.” Id. The
coworker replied, “That is why you always have to smile!!!!” Id.
245. See id.
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belong to the company and the company had no control over it.246 The
District of Puerto Rico found that the social media comment was sufficiently
work related to be included in the totality of the circumstances but found that
it was offhand and not severe or pervasive enough to be actionable in a Title
VII claim.247 In contrast, the Eastern District of New York, in Fisher v.
Mermaid Manor Home for Adults, LLC,248 held that a reasonable jury could
find that a coworker’s post on a personal Instagram account was severe or
pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment where the employee’s
coworker shared two photographs of the employee comparing her picture to
a fictional chimpanzee from the Planet of the Apes movie.249 Specifically,
the court highlighted that the Instagram post was public and humiliated the
plaintiff to such an extent that she was found crying on the workplace
premises.250 Thus, in each of these cases, courts found that the social media
posts were connected to the workplace when the speech was directed at
employees.
Recent court cases have also considered whether offensive social media
posts on personal pages and not directed at specific employees violated social
media policies. In Grutzmacher v. Howard County,251 Kevin Buker sued his
employer, the county fire department, after he was discharged for violating
the department’s social media policy, which he alleged was unconstitutional
under the First Amendment.252 In November 2012, the department had
issued social media guidelines.253 In addition to prohibiting employees from
sharing any statements that could be interpreted as undermining the “views
or positions” of the department, the social media guidelines prohibited
employees from “posting or publishing statements, opinions or information
that might reasonably be interpreted as discriminatory, harassing,
defamatory, racially or ethnically derogatory, or sexually violent when such
statements . . . may place the Department in disrepute or negatively impact
the ability of the Department in carrying out its mission.”254 On January 20,
2013, Buker made a social media post on his personal Facebook page
criticizing liberal gun control policies.255 The comment stated, “My aide had
an outstanding idea . . lets all kill someone with a liberal . . . then maybe we
can get them outlawed too! Think of the satisfaction of beating a liberal to
death with another liberal . . . its [sic] almost poetic . . . ”256 Shortly after,
Mark Grutzmacher, a county volunteer paramedic unaffiliated with the
department, replied to the post with a comment stating, “But. . . . was it an
246. See id. at 82–83.
247. See id. at 85–86.
248. 192 F. Supp. 3d 323 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
249. See id. at 329.
250. Id.
251. 851 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2017).
252. See id. at 336.
253. See id. at 337.
254. Id.
255. See id. at 338.
256. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellant, Volume I of III
at A644, Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d 332 (No. 15-2066)).
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‘assult [sic] liberal’? Gotta pick a fat one, those are the ‘high capacity’ ones.
Oh . . . pick a black one, those are more ‘scary’. Sorry had to perfect on a
cool idea!”257 Buker liked the comment and replied, “Lmfao! Too cool Mark
Grutzmacher!”258
A captain in the department emailed the fire chief with screenshots of the
posts, and the department moved Buker out of his field operations role to an
administrative position pending an internal investigation.259 Ultimately,
Buker’s own posts and his reply to Grutzmacher’s comment were a part of
the charges presented at a pretermination meeting.260 After that meeting, the
fire chief terminated Buker’s employment.261
The Fourth Circuit found that the First Amendment protected the
conversation overall because the subject matter touched on public
concerns.262 Considering the racially charged comment, however, the court
found that the department was reasonably concerned that people could
interpret Buker’s “like” and positive reply as support for racism or bias.263
The court also found that Buker’s liking and replying to the comment led to
the disruption of trust and harmony in the department.264 Thus, the court
held that the department’s interest in maintaining public trust, promoting an
efficient workplace, and preventing disruption outweighed the employee’s
interest in free speech.265
Similarly, in Sabatini v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department,266 an
officer sued the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department claiming that the
department’s social media policy violated his First Amendment rights.267
The department’s social media policy, which governed the department’s
official use of social media and employees’ personal use of social media,
specifically prohibited employees from sharing “speech that ridicules,
maligns, disparages, or otherwise promotes discrimination against race,
ethnicity, religion, sex, national origin, sexual orientation, age, disability,
political affiliation, gender identity and expression.”268 The sheriff fired the
officer after he made several racially offensive Facebook posts.269 For
example, the officer shared a post from another Facebook profile that
displayed a parody of Barack Obama’s campaign image, replacing the words
“HOPE” with “ROPE” and depicting him with a noose around his neck.270
257. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellant, Volume I of III
at A644, Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d 332 (No. 15-2066)).
258. Id. (quoting Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellant, Volume I of III, at A12 Grutzmacher,
851 F.3d 332 (No. 15-2066)).
259. See id. at 339.
260. See id. at 339–40.
261. Id. at 340.
262. See id. at 343.
263. See id. at 347.
264. See id. at 346.
265. See id. at 345.
266. 369 F. Supp. 3d 1066 (D. Nev. 2019).
267. See id. at 1086.
268. Id. at 1097.
269. See id. at 1078.
270. Id. at 1075.
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The officer commented, “I guess the emperor thought it was going to be a
lovefest sprinkled with unicorns and glitter when he opened his POTUS
twitter account. Think again. I don’t see that lasting very long.”271 The
officer also made several posts about the Black Lives Matter movement and
referred to its supporters as “ghetto trash race baiting scumbags” who “blame
their laziness and misfortunes on others” and “[r]ace baiting pieces of shit”
who should “[b]urn in hell.”272 He also shared two articles about Michael
Brown, a young Black man who was killed by police officers in Ferguson,
Missouri.273 One of the articles was entitled, “Michael Brown Memorial—
A Memorial to Why Blacks are Ghetto Dwellers,” to which the officer
commented “[a]nd there was a video of this piece of shit punching out an old
man. Real hero. Ghetto thug turd.”274
The District of Nevada found that these posts included content that could
be protected as a matter of public concern despite the racist connotations but
ultimately held that the department’s interest in protecting public trust and
promoting an efficient workplace outweighed the employee’s free speech
interests.275 Additionally, the court found that the officer’s social media
posts “violated the social-media policy by promoting discrimination against
African Americans.”276 The court reaffirmed the framework established in
Pickering v. Board of Education,277 which states that public employees can
express themselves as private citizens as long as their speech does not impair
the employer’s ability to serve the public.278
Legal commentators have opined about how courts should evaluate
employer liability for employee misconduct on social media under Title
VII.279 Jeremy Gelms argues that in determining whether social media
conduct should be considered in the totality of the circumstances in hostile
work environment claims, courts should assess whether the employer derived
a substantial benefit from the online forum.280 Gelms explains that, as noted
in Blakey, the substantial benefit test allows the courts to determine whether
the social media was “sufficiently integrated” into the employer’s business
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1076.
273. Id.; see also Michael Brown’s Shooting and Its Immediate Aftermath in Ferguson,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/12/us/13policeshooting-of-black-teenager-michael-brown.html [https://perma.cc/9K64-AYYE].
274. Sabatini, 369 F. Supp. 3d at 1076.
275. See id. at 1085.
276. Id. at 1100.
277. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
278. See id. at 568; Sabatini, 369 F. Supp. 3d at 1098–99; supra note 43.
279. See Jeremy Gelms, Comment, High-Tech Harassment: Employer Liability Under
Title VII for Employee Social Media Misconduct, 87 WASH. L. REV. 249 (2012); see also John
Paul, Workplace Cyberharassment: Employer and Website Operator Liability for Online
Misconduct, 33 NE. J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2015).
280. Gelms, supra note 279, at 251. Gelms argues that courts should only consider social
media hate speech when employers derive a substantial benefit from the online forum. Id.
This Note argues that courts should consider social media hate speech in discrimination cases
as long as the employer knew about the speech and failed to take action against it and
regardless of whether the employer derived a substantial benefit from the online forum.
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and thus an extension of the workplace.281 Gelms presents three arguments
to support the use of the substantial benefit test. First, Gelms argues that the
substantial benefit test is consistent with agency principles that limit
employer liability to actions that are “aided by the agency relationship.”282
In other words, liability is consistent with agency principles if, without the
employment relationship, the conduct could not have occurred.283 Second,
Gelms argues that the substantial benefit test recognizes the expanding
concept of the workplace while still excluding conduct that is not an
extension of the work environment, such as activity on an employee’s
personal social media page.284 Third, Gelms argues that the substantial
benefit analysis would guide employers on how to update their antiharassment policies to address the use of technological platforms.285
Professor John Paul sets out the same arguments but further proposes that
website operators should be liable for harassment in cases where the
employer is not liable because they have control over the sites and can
remove offenders.286 The next part proposes that the EEOC should expand
workplace protections against racist online hate speech.
III. THE EEOC SHOULD EXPAND EMPLOYEE PROTECTIONS AS
WORKPLACE BOUNDARIES EVOLVE
Given the origins and purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
development of the hostile work environment claim, and the significant
changes to the workplace, a focus on curtailing the harmful effects of racist
online hate speech in the workplace is needed. This part argues that the
EEOC should expand its guidelines to state that courts should consider racist
hate speech on social media, including posts on employees’ personal social
media pages, in hostile work environment claims. Part III.A demonstrates
that such an expansion is supported by the plain text of Title VII and the
EEOC Harassment Guidelines, Supreme Court precedent, and the federal
government’s recent considerations about curtailing online hate speech. Part
III.B expands on the benefits of the suggested change to employees,
specifically the protection against psychological harm from racist hate
speech. Part III.C describes how expanded protections would advance the
employers’ interests in preventing disruptions in the workplace and curtailing
reputational harm.
A. Consistency with Plain Text, Precedent, and the Movement to Curtail
Hate Speech
Expanding federal workplace protections to allow the consideration of
racist hate speech on social media in harassment claims is consistent with the
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 273; see also Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 558 (N.J. 2000).
Gelms, supra note 279, at 275–76.
See id. at 275.
See id. at 276–77.
See id. at 277–78.
Paul, supra note 279, at 14.
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plain text of Title VII and the EEOC Harassment Guidelines. As the
Supreme Court found in Vinson, Congress’s use of the broad terms
“conditions, or privileges of employment” in Title VII demonstrates that
Congress intended to prohibit a broad range of discriminatory practices.287
The EEOC Harassment Guidelines are consistent with this expansive view
because they broadly penalize conduct that unreasonably interferes with an
individual’s work performance or creates a hostile or offensive working
environment.288 Additionally, the EEOC Harassment Guidelines state that
the EEOC will consider the totality of the circumstances in harassment
claims.289 Furthermore, as the Fifth Circuit described in Rogers, the first
case recognizing the hostile work environment claim, courts should consider
the “nuances and subtleties” of discrimination.290
There have been several instances in which the Supreme Court has
expanded the application of Title VII, consistent with this broad reading.291
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,292 the Supreme Court held that Title VII’s
prohibitions against discrimination applied to practices that produced a
disparate impact and not just conduct that resulted in disparate treatment.293
In Vinson, the Court expanded the doctrine to include practices that create an
abusive or hostile work environment and that alter the “conditions of
employment.”294 In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,295 the Court held that
employment decisions made based on someone’s gender violate Title VII.296
Most recently, in Bostock v. Clayton County,297 the Supreme Court extended
Title VII’s protections to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation
or transgender status.298 This case, resulting in a 6-3 decision, indicates that
the current Supreme Court might read the Civil Rights Act broadly. Justice
Gorsuch, a conservative and textualist, wrote the opinion, holding that
discrimination based on sex included discrimination based on sexual
orientation.299 Furthermore, even though Justice Barrett has replaced Justice

287. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
288. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2020).
289. Id. § 1604.11(b).
290. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
291. See Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 283, 319–20 (2003) (asserting that courts have been willing to make significant
paradigm shifts regarding antidiscrimination doctrine).
292. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
293. See id. at 431 (stating that “[t]he Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation”). Congress codified this
“disparate impact” doctrine in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII. See
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
294. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
295. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
296. See id. at 229.
297. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
298. See id. at 1754 (holding that “[a]n employer who fires an individual merely for being
gay or transgender defies the law”).
299. See id.
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg,300 a majority of the Court may support a broad reading
of Title VII consistent with Bostock.
As several countries301 including the United States recognize and consider
the need to curtail hate speech on social media, the EEOC should expand its
regulations to state that racist hate speech on personal social media pages can
be actionable in hostile work environment claims. Even though social media
posts on personal pages may not be connected to the workplace and
employers may not derive a substantial benefit from an employees’ private
profiles, racist hate speech shared by an employee can still negatively affect
the workplace environment by affecting other employees. This analysis is
consistent with Crowley,302 Lapka,303 Dowd,304 and Blakey,305 where courts
found that nonworkplace conduct can still create a hostile work environment
and that offensive conduct does not need to transpire in the workplace but
only needs to have consequences in the workplace. Thus, courts should not
have to determine whether the employer derives a substantial benefit from
the online platform.306
Additionally, in Harris, the Supreme Court stated that courts should
consider the totality of the circumstances to assess whether an environment
is hostile or abusive, including whether the conduct unreasonably interferes
with the employee’s work performance and whether it affects the employee’s
psychological well-being.307 One significant effect of hate speech is the
emotional and psychological harm that it can cause employees.308 These
effects are no different when the content is viewed on a work-related platform
or a personal social media page. Therefore, in hostile work environment
claims, courts should consider the psychological harm that can result from
viewing a fellow employee’s racist social media post.
B. Benefits to Employees and Protection Against Psychological Harm
Courts should consider racist hate speech on an employee’s personal social
media page in workplace harassment claims because racist hate speech can
cause psychological harm and interfere with an employee’s work
performance. Racial insults can cause psychological harm, such as
humiliation, isolation, self-hatred, and physical harm, such as high blood
pressure.309 In addition to physical and psychological harm, racial insults
300. See Lara Bazelon, Opinion, Amy Coney Barrett Is No Ruth Bader Ginsburg, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/26/opinion/amy-coney-barrettnominee.html [https://perma.cc/DGF5-LXGX].
301. See supra notes 148–52 and accompanying text.
302. 303 F.3d 387, 409–10 (1st Cir. 2002).
303. 517 F.3d 974, 983 (7th Cir. 2008).
304. 253 F.3d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 2001).
305. 751 A.2d 538, 549 (N.J. 2000).
306. See supra notes 280–83 and accompanying text.
307. See supra text accompanying note 95.
308. See generally Carter & Scheuermann, supra note 112.
309. See Beausoleil, supra note 123, at 2144 (concluding that hate speech should not fall
into any protected category under the First Amendment and advocating for a change in First
Amendment doctrine to combat the psychological impacts of social media on behavior and
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can severely affect victims’ careers because employees may experience
issues like defeatism or develop expectations of failure.310 Negative
psychological impacts stemming from the use of social media itself can
further compound the harmful effects of hate speech.311 Even racial jokes,
which many people view as less harmful than other forms of racial
discrimination, were found by the Ninth Circuit to warrant a valid hostile
work environment claim in Swinton v. Potomac Corp.312
The Supreme Court has also acknowledged the harms of hate speech.313
Specifically, the Court has stated that “a discriminatorily abusive work
environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees’
psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ job
performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them
from advancing in their careers.”314 Although posts of racist hate speech on
personal social media pages may not be directed toward a specific employee,
like the posts in Grutzmacher315 and Sabatini,316 they can still affect the
workplace by impacting employees who have viewed the post and have to
interact with the offending supervisor or employee. Furthermore, as the court
asserts in Parrish, while those who share hate speech can minimize their offsite activities, employees who view the hate speech still have to deal with the
consequences.317 Thus, courts should consider racist hate speech on personal
social media pages in the totality of the circumstances.
In light of the serious psychological and practical harms that racist speech
can cause, courts should also consider whether racial harassment deserves its
own legal standard. The objective prong of the test used in hostile work
environment claims under Harris is whether a reasonable person would find
the conduct abusive or hostile.318 Melissa Hughes suggests that the
reasonable person standard might disadvantage minorities because white
people may not be aware of how offensive certain comments or behaviors
are.319 This view is consistent with Professor Hébert’s position that the strict

the psychological harms of hate speech). See generally Richard Delgado, Words That Wound:
A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133
(1982) (proposing a tort cause of action for racial insults); Johnny Holschuh, Comment,
#CivilRightsCybertorts: Utilizing Torts to Combat Hate Speech in Online Social Media, 82
U. CIN. L. REV. 953 (2014) (discussing the viability of tort claims against hate speech,
including intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, intimidation, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 claims).
310. See Delgado, supra note 309, at 139.
311. See Loren Soeiro, Is Social Media Bad for You?, PSYCH. TODAY (June 21, 2019),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/i-hear-you/201906/is-social-media-bad-you
[https://perma.cc/28KV-APRN] (explaining that research has found links between excessive
Facebook and Instagram use and depression and loneliness).
312. 270 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2001).
313. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
314. Id.
315. See supra notes 255–57 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 269–73 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
319. See Hughes, supra note 114, at 1472–74.
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sexual harassment standards, such as the severe and pervasive standard, may
lead courts to find that serious racially discriminatory acts are not
As a remedy, Hughes notes that some courts and
actionable.320
commentators have suggested changing the standard from a reasonable
person standard to a reasonable minority standard.321 Such a change in the
legal standard would parallel recent state level changes to the standard for
sexual harassment322 and resolve some of the tension that Professor Hébert
highlights regarding the detriment of imposing strict sexual harassment
standards on legitimate racial harassment claims.323 The next section will
discuss the benefits that curtailing online hate speech would have for
employers and how employers’ and employees’ interests can be balanced.
C. Benefits to Employers and Combatting Economic and Reputational Risk
In considering claims involving racist speech on social media, courts have
analyzed the Pickering factors to balance an employer’s interests against the
public employee’s free speech interest.324 Courts have held that an
employer’s interest in these factors may outweigh an employee’s free speech
interest. In Bennett v. Metropolitan Government,325 a public employee used
a racial slur in a discussion about the 2020 presidential election on
Facebook.326 The Sixth Circuit held that sufficient disruption was found to
“tip the Pickering balance” toward the employer.327 In describing the
disruption, the court noted that “employees were upset at work, counselors
320. See supra text accompanying note 120.
321. See Hughes, supra note 114, at 1473.
322. States including California, Illinois, and New York recently implemented new laws
removing the severe or pervasive standard for sexual harassment claims in response to the
#MeToo movement. See Erik A. Christiansen, How Are the Laws Sparked by #MeToo
Affecting Workplace Harassment?, AM. BAR ASS’N (May 8, 2020), https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation-news/featured-articles/2020/new-state-lawsexpand-workplace-protections-sexual-harassment-victims [https://perma.cc/P9LN-C2MM];
Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation Enacting Sweeping New Workplace Harassment
Protections, N.Y. STATE (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governorcuomo-signs-legislation-enacting-sweeping-new-workplace-harassment-protections
[https://perma.cc/69YA-PUYB].
323. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see also Bennett v. Metro. Gov’t, 977 F.3d
530, 540–41 (6th Cir. 2020) (finding that impairment of harmony among coworkers,
detrimental impact on close working relationships, interference with the operation of the
workplace, and detraction from employer’s mission were Pickering factors weighing in favor
of the employer); Grutzmacher v. Howard County, 851 F.3d 332, 345 (4th Cir. 2017) (stating
that factors include “whether a public employee’s speech (1) impaired the maintenance of
discipline by supervisors; (2) impaired harmony among coworkers; (3) damaged close
personal relationships; (4) impeded the performance of the public employee’s duties; (5)
interfered with the operation of the institution; (6) undermined the mission of the institution;
(7) was communicated to the public or to coworkers in private; (8) conflicted with the
responsibilities of the employee within the institution; and (9) abused the authority and public
accountability that the employee’s role entailed”); Sabatini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t,
369 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1071 (D. Nev. 2019).
325. 977 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2020).
326. See id. at 534.
327. Id. at 545.
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needed to be involved, and stress levels increased for the agency as a
whole.”328
Although Pickering does not apply to private employers, these factors
equally negatively impact them. Professors Robert Carter and Thomas
Scheuermann consider the workplace costs of trauma associated with racism
and racial discrimination.329 Specifically, employees can experience
lowered productivity and damage to team efforts.330 Furthermore, racism
can significantly harm employees’ creativity and communication.331
Companies that are proactive against racism in the workplace environment
experience several benefits, including happier employees, increased
collaboration, more effective workplaces with less stress, and fewer
harassment and discrimination claims.332
Although free speech rights are important to democratic values, they are
not absolute and must be balanced with the constitutional value of equal
protection.333 Along with increased employer responsibility, however,
comes the need to balance employer resources and prevent overreaching.
Overreaching is not a significant concern for three reasons. First, as
Garmager argues, the burden on employers will not be increased because,
under the negligence standards of Ellerth and Faragher, employers will only
be liable for failing to take proactive measures against hate speech,334 and
employees would still have to take advantage of the employer’s preventative
or corrective measures.335 Additionally, the EEOC Harassment Guidelines
already encourage employers to establish preventative measures against
harassment.336 Second, to achieve a balance of preserving First Amendment
interests and prohibiting speech that has little value, employers should only
be liable for failing to take action against racist hate speech when it has the
potential to affect an individual’s working environment. Critical race theorist
Mari Matsuda sets forth three factors to determine whether speech is harmful
rather than merely offensive: (1) whether the message is one of racial
inferiority; (2) whether the message is directed against a historically
oppressed group; and (3) whether the message is persecutory, hateful, and
degrading.337 Employers should apply these factors to complaints to avoid
overreaching.
Third, many employers already have antidiscrimination and social media
policies that permit them to act against speech to prevent economic and
reputational harm. To demonstrate that they have taken preventative steps
328. Id. at 536.
329. See Carter & Scheuermann, supra note 112, at 11–12.
330. See id.
331. See id.
332. See id. at 99.
333. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 481.
334. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 108, 210 and accompanying text.
336. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
337. See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2357 (1989).

1588

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

against hate speech on social media, employers should establish clear
standards in their policies that put employees on notice about the types of
speech on social media that the employer could penalize. In addition to
limiting frivolous complaints using Matsuda’s factors, employers could also
establish appropriate corrective measures and complaint procedures that
employees would have to follow when reporting racist social media posts.
The Supreme Court explained in Ellerth that if the employer has adequate
complaint procedures, an employee’s failure to use the complaint procedures
will usually satisfy the employer’s burden in a workplace environment
claim.338 Thus, employers would only be liable if they fail to implement
preventative measures, such as updated social media policies, and corrective
measures, such as reporting procedures. Preventing economic and
reputational harm is worth the implementation of these measures to curtail
employees’ racist online hate speech and ensure that workplace harassment
does not take a pervasive virtual form.
CONCLUSION
The federal government should not ignore the harms of hate speech in the
workplace. As harassment jurisprudence continues to expand, the EEOC
should consider how a politically divided and increasingly virtual work
environment uniquely affects victims of racial harassment. Racist hate
speech can damage an employee’s psychological well-being and have
adverse effects on work performance both inside of the workplace and over
the web. To curtail the harms of racist hate speech in the workplace, the
EEOC should expand anti-harassment doctrine to state that courts can
consider racist hate speech on employees’ private social media pages in the
totality of the circumstances in hostile work environment claims. This is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s broad reading of Title VII, the global
push to combat hate speech, society’s interest in preventing psychological
harm in the workplace, and employers’ interest in maintaining a productive
and efficient work environment.
To comply with this expansion, employers should update their social
media policies to notify employees that harmful and degrading racist hate
speech on their personal pages may be penalized if viewed and reported by a
supervisor or coworker. Updating EEOC regulations to state that courts can
consider online hate speech in hostile work environment claims reflects a
commitment to Title VII’s original purpose of preventing discrimination
even in an ever-evolving modern workplace.

338. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).

